I INTRODUCTION
This paper estimates the employment effects of mergers using data from the South African gold mining industry. Public perception traditionally associates mergers and acquisitions (M&A) with employment losses (Brown & Medoff, 1988) . The welfare loss to workers associated with retrenchments can be pronounced in countries with high unemployment. Given that South Africa has an official unemployment rate of 25% (Statistics South Africa, 2007) , it is no surprise that employment consequences are a major concern. However, even in the United States, 63% of the public believe employees are the one group that should be protected in the event of a hostile takeover (Brown & Medoff, 1988) .
Public concern has been accompanied by official responses. Legislation in the European Union exists specifically to limit cross border M&A related employment losses (Osman, 2001) . South Africa also has labor law for mergers while its competition authorities consider potential employment losses before approving a merger (ILO, 2003; Republic of South Africa, 1998) .
Despite both public and official concern with potential employment losses, the theoretical justification is ambiguous. If takeovers result in better management and more productive use of assets, workers could benefit in the form of higher wages and/or expanded employment, but critics claim productivity gains come exclusively from retrenchments (ILO, 2003) . Schleifer & Summers (1988) and others argue that mergers allow for the breaking of implicit contracts within the acquired firm and hence allow the new ownership to reduce employment levels. It is therefore important to investigate these effects empirically.
Empirical studies of mining mergers are important in both a South African and international context. A merger wave is currently underway across a wide spectrum of resources.
1 Focusing on gold, there was an unsuccessful hostile bid by Harmony Gold for Gold Fields, which would have made the combined entity the world's largest gold producer (SABC, 2005) . The successful bid by Barrick for Placer Dome effective January 2006 made it the world's largest gold producer (CBC, 2005) . The South African gold mining industry is an industry in decline, which we will argue is an appropriate setting for the Schleifer & Summers (1988) argument.
Existing empirical work yields little evidence for merger-related employment losses in the United States, but recent research has found a significant negative effect of mergers on employment in Europe (e.g. Conyon, Girma, Thompson & Wright, 2002; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2004) . We contribute to the empirical literature by using data that has numerous advantages for accurate estimation. For example, it is not subject to various merger definition issues and output is a homogenous good (kilograms of gold). Furthermore, we will argue that the mergers took place largely for exogenous reasons, which makes it more likely that the effect we are identifying is a causal one.
Section II presents the theoretical, empirical and institutional background and Section III discusses the specifications used to estimate labor demand. Section IV documents the data and describes trends in the South African gold industry. Section V finds statistically significant employment losses of the same magnitude as those found for Continental Europe by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) , which is notable given that South African labor markets exhibit many Continental European rigidities. It also produces coefficients consistent with standard producer theory. Section VI offers a concluding discussion.
II THEORETICAL, EMPIRICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Despite stylized perceptions of merger-induced employment losses, theoretical predictions are ambiguous. One possible motivation for merging is to raise price and restrict output, which would reduce employment. Despite gold producers being large on the world stage, the annual flow of global production is only 2% of the stock of gold supplied (Borenstein & Farrell, 2006) . Miners are therefore price takers and this reason is ruled out. Jensen (1984) argues that takeovers occur because of different opinions over asset values stemming from the acquirer's belief he can manage the assets better. This could lead to immediate post-acquisition retrenchment. However, if successful, the acquirers would raise the value of the firm and, if anything, improve the standing of employees (Conyon et al., 2002) .
Another view is that mergers may lead to lower research and development (R&D) intensities and subsequently lower employment. Work by Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1990 , by Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) and again by Hall (1998) with newer and better data concludes there is slim evidence for a systematic and material decline in industry or corporate R&D after a merger. However, this evidence is largely restricted to US manufacturing and the authors note there is a large degree of heterogeneity by industry.
Alternatively, post-takeover gains to shareholders could come as a transfer of the firm's surplus from labor to capital without any resulting productivity improvements. For example, Schleifer and Summers (1988) argue that M&As generate a transfer from labor to capital. They allow for opportunistic behavior by managers who renege on implicit contracts built up within the firm. Such contracts could include implicit employment insurance or seniority-based pay. In the Schleifer & Summers formulation, such implicit contracts form as trust develops between incumbent managers and employees. Takeovers would lead to a breach of trust and reneging on those contracts. Williamson (1988) suggests managerial discretion may be the source of such implicit contracts. Managers who prefer the quiet life give employees more generous employment terms in return for co-operation. In the face of negative industry circumstances, such managers are reluctant to roll back such concessions, while tougher managers may be more willing to do so. Holmstrom (1988) suggests managers with career concerns maximize their rents subject to the demands of uncoordinated shareholders and organized labor. Incumbents are more likely to keep their relatively strong employee constituents happy, but corporate raiders may be better coordinated than shareholders and may thus engineer a transfer of rents away from labor.
In a declining industry, firms should adjust their desired level of output downward over time, but the existence of implicit contracts presents adjustment costs. A merger would allow for less costly breach of these contracts and a quicker adjustment towards desired employment levels. Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) argue that explicit labor market rigidities can also result in slower labor shedding if they make implicit contracts more sustainable. Explicit rigidities often foster insider markets, where insider employees are to some extent protected from cyclical fluctuations and a loss of their own human capital. Furthermore, such settings tend to coincide with strong labor unions, which would lead to a higher share of rents going to employees.
Labor markets in South Africa have more in common with those in Europe than those in the United States.
2 South African firms intending to retrench for operational reasons must consult with organized labor, but do not have to negotiate. While firms ultimately have the right to proceed with retrenchments, the law allows employees to strike in opposition (Werksmans Inc., 2006) . South African mining unions grew stronger in the 1980s and 1990s. Increased power was demonstrated in a serious strike in 1987 and entrenched by the introduction of new labor legislation in 1995. Together with rigidities, this indicates the kind of employee power in which the implicit contract theories discussed may operate. In the gold industry, dramatic job losses led to the formation of a Gold Crisis Committee in the late 1990s, in which stakeholders agreed a formal procedure for negotiating terms of layoffs and improving coordination. Such procedures would allow implicit agreements to build up between workers and management. However, moral suasion was the main mechanism and the final step of the procedure would revert to the legal rights of firms -under new management perhaps -to retrench (Segal & Malherbe, 2000) .
Earlier empirical studies on the United States -notably Brown & Medoff (1988) ; Bhagat, Schleifer & Vishny (1990) and McGuckin, Nguyen & Reznek (1995) -find minimal employment losses and even employment gains. Lichtenberg & Siegel (1991) find some employment losses in the United States but McGuckin (2001) finds no evidence that ownership changes are deliberately used to cut employment. Conyon et al. (2002) find evidence for employment losses in the United Kingdom, with changes being larger for mergers in related industries and in hostile takeovers. Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) find almost no effect in the United States but a significantly negative effect in the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. This supports their claim that explicitly rigid labor markets may provide more opportunities for breaching implicit contracts after a merger. If South African labor market rigidities are similar to those found in Europe, we would expect the employment losses associated with mergers to be similar to those found for Europe and greater than those found in the United States.
III ESTIMATION STRATEGY
Following the general approach found in Conyon et al. (2002) , we estimate a conditional labor demand function in the presence of quadratic adjustment costs and a Cobb Douglas technology.
l, q and w are the logs of employment, gold output and wages while M is the merger variable to be described in Section IV. t is a trend term. It could proxy factor-biased technological progress, which may impact on the demand for labor.
We estimate (1) and calculate the long run coefficients. However, we can write (1) in conditional equilibrium correction form:
where (2) has an appealing interpretation. α represents correction of disequilibrium, which is potentially created by the employment adjustment costs. As an alternative to estimating the residual z according to the Engle-Granger (1987) 2-step approach, one can estimate the unconstrained ECM (Banerjee, Dolado & Mestre, 1998) :
Treating γ 5 as the error correction term imposes the necessary restriction for identifying the long run coefficients. Consistent estimation of z would lead to the same estimates of the effects of mergers in all three specifications. One advantage of (4) is potential power gains in single equation cointegration tests (Banerjee et al., 1998) . A potential obstacle to consistent estimates of the merger variable is endogeneity bias. Mergers may occur because some firms are carrying too much labor, or they may take place in times when the industry requires consolidation. We believe this potential source of endogeneity does not invalidate our results. Segal and Malherbe (2000) note various reasons why restructurings can be valueenhancing in mining. The reason behind the M&A boom was overwhelmingly the opening up of South Africa's capital market and the relaxation of exchange controls. Because of foreign exchange restrictions, many firms sought diversification in their mining activities as a substitute for geographical diversity. The lifting of exchange controls saw the end of the diversified mining house as firms concentrated on their core capabilities and sought cheaper sources of capital abroad. Therefore, the timing of the M&A activity and choices of which firms to buy or sell were generally driven by broader strategic factors and not labor related issues.
Generally, Lichtenberg & Siegel (1991) find employment losses explain a small part of the acquisition premium. This suggests that, although shareholders may gain from reneging on implicit contracts, the opportunity to do so is not a significant motivation for a takeover. Nonetheless, the choice of which firms to acquire could still be influenced in part by the potential to shed labor. Thus, we cannot completely discount the possibility that some endogeneity bias remains.
Furthermore, we unfortunately do not have reliable indicators of R&D to consider an alternative channel from mergers to employment, nor are we able to identify the direct effects of changes in costs of capital over time.
IV DATA AND INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
We use annual data from 1980 to 2004 for four provinces, which represent 99% of South African output. While we have mine level data on merger and acquisition activity, we have labor data at a provincial level only. Firm or plant level data would potentially offer many advantages, including a large number of observations and more accurate representation of heterogeneous products and processes. However, provincial data is sufficient for our needs because we are studying a homogeneous product and thus need not worry about heterogeneity issues. Our data has the advantage that output is measured in kilograms of gold, avoiding the need to worry about deflators over time.
For firm level data, the standard approach is to represent merger activity by one or more dummy variables (eg Brown & Medoff, 1988) , which usually take on the value of one in the period in which a merger occurs and zero otherwise. For provincial data, which incorporates a number of different mines and potentially multiple M&A transactions, a slightly different approach is required. Specifically, the zero-one dummy variable reflecting whether a merger took place or not in a province is incapable of differentiating the relative size of the mergers, which is important for estimating the coefficient on the impact of the merger activity in the province on mine employment in the province.
Given that M&A transactions are of different sizes, our M&A variable is the weight of an M&A transaction in a province (determined by the ratio of gold output of the assets being transacted to the provincial gold output) times a zeroone dummy for when an M&A transaction takes place. Formally, M it =W it D it , where D it is a zero-one dummy for where one or more M&A merger events took place in the province or not. W it is the ratio of the output of the mine or mines transacted in the province to the provincial output size that year. We account for transactions across provinces by assigning the output-weighted values to each province. For example, a mine from one province acquiring a mine from another would only be represented in the acquired mine's province while a deal involving acquisitions in two provinces would be represented in both provinces.
Having details on each mine involved in a transaction allows us to control for any divestment activity, which would exaggerate the employment losses after a merger (Conyon et al., 2002) . As the focus of the study is the employment effects of M&A, we do not include internal restructurings or the purchases of minority shareholdings in other mines. Because the possible employment and other effects of mergers can not take place instantaneously, mergers effected in the final quarter of a given year are deemed to have taken place the following year. Table 1 gives summary statistics for the employment, gold and wage variables. We include information for the start and end of our sample and for 1987, which was an important year because it reflected newly established bargaining power of the mining trade unions and marked a turning point for employment (Segal & Malherbe, 2000) . Table 2 gives information on mergers overall and for each province over the 25 years covered by our sample. We discuss some interesting features of the data with the aid of the two tables as well as In Figure 1 , the downward trend in employment for all four provinces is clear. Table 1 (Matthews, 2008) . 4 Although there have been recent rises in the nominal dollar gold price, a key contributor to the decline of the South African industry is increasing mine maturity, lower yields, and higher costs (Segal & Malherbe, 2000) . Table 2 shows there are 45 mergers in our dataset. M&A activity is the variable used in our regressions; M&A affected about 5% of output in any given year on average, with 10% affected in Mpumalanga. Figure 4 shows the activity occurred predominantly in the ten years starting in the mid 1990s. Mergers appeared to coincide with periods of pronounced employment falls, especially in Mpumalanga.
V RESULTS
Figures 1-3 suggest the data are strongly trended and/or non-stationary. There is a priori no problem with testing each individual time series separately for unit roots and, if appropriate, cointegration. Furthermore, panel unit root tests -see Baltagi (2005) -do not yield meaningful power gains when the cross-section dimension is small and when there is large cross-section dependence, which is particularly likely for our data. Using the approaches developed by Perron (1989) to deal with exogenous breaks or regime shifts, we find evidence that the wage, employment and output variables are integrated of order 1. Johansen (1991) tests suggest the variables are cointegrated, consistent with a static long run labor demand relationship. Details of the tests are available in the appendix and further discussion is provided in a working paper version of this article (Behar & Hodge, 2007) . Table 3 presents the results of the pooled estimates. Panels I and II are estimated and presented in ARDL form, with the long run coefficients calculated.
This familiar representation reveals the desirable convergence characteristics of a negative coefficient on wages and a positive coefficient on lagged wages. The year/trend coefficient is negative, which could be capturing technological change that does not favour workers.
The merger variable is significantly negative. Taken literally, the coefficient of -0.079 in panel I indicates that a merger involving 15% of provincial output would reduce employment by approximately 1% in that year. Because it is an industry in decline, these jobs could eventually be lost slowly over time, so we don't present a long run merger effect nor speculate what the effect would be over multiple periods.
An alternative interpretation of the merger coefficient is that it merely captures the accelerated employment decline in the late 1990s, with which much merger activity happened to coincide. To accommodate this view, we include a term to represent the post-1997 period in panel II. While the significant variable is consistent with this interpretation, it could also be capturing the effects of accelerated wage increases, as evidenced by lower coefficients on the wage variables. Importantly, it fails to unseat the merger variable. Panel III would give precisely the same coefficients if we didn't lose observations from differencing; it makes clear the appealing interpretation of labor adjusting slowly to the long run equilibrium because of adjustment costs but instantaneously falling when a merger takes place and removes some of these costs.
While the estimates in panels I-III have many desirable properties in terms of coefficient signs, the long run coefficients are slightly on the low side. In accordance with standard producer theory, we expect the coefficient on output to be close to unity and on wages to be close to 0.5. The latter is based on the industry-wide phenomenon that labor costs comprise half of total costs (Handley, 2004) . Panel IV presents long run coefficients close to theoretical expectations estimated by the two-step (Engle-Granger, 1987) method. This has the added advantage of allowing us to model the trend term explicitly as part of the cointegrating vector, whereas we have imposed no such restriction on the previous estimates.
From inspection of the long run and impact coefficients in IV, it appears that much of the adjustment to wage changes happens almost instantaneously while only half the adjustment to changes in output occurs within that year. In the context of a declining industry, this suggests firms have excess labor. The significant merger variable is consistent with the view that some of this excess labor can be reduced after a merger. Unlike II and III, panel IV has an insignificant break term while the merger coefficient is slightly larger, which would reject the view that the merger coefficient is just capturing the traumatic period for labor after 1997. Nonetheless, such a proxy is imperfect and we cannot be sure the effects of wages, mergers and broader trends are not being conflated. Various additional steps were taken to gauge robustness. Pesaran & Smith (1995) warn that parameter heterogeneity across the panel may bias the long run coefficients. However, even province specific controls appear unnecessary, as evidenced by the generally insignificant province dummies. Also, this panel is unlikely to have heterogeneous characteristics relative to other panels as it consists entirely of gold mines. Nonetheless, the graphical analysis reveals some potential differences in the trends and breaks. Therefore, seemingly unrelated regressions for each of the four provinces were run. The results are not reported in the interest of space, but yield an average coefficient on mergers of -0.154 and a Wald test finds the merger variables jointly significant. Finally, we run PraisWinston (1954) estimates to allow for potential heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional contemporaneous correlation and panel specific AR(1) errors. These too find the merger dummy significant and of the same order as the results presented. Details are available from the authors on request.
VI CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Our results consistently show a significant negative effect of mergers on employment. The coefficient values in the labor demand specifications support the view that the presence of adjustment costs delays the adjustment of labor quantities to equilibrium. In the context of a declining industry, the results are consistent with the view that mergers provide an opportunity for firms to reduce labor quantities closer to optimal levels.
The coefficients of -0.071 to -0.079 in panels I-III match the values for Continental Europe of -0.067 for related mergers and -0.079 overall found by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) . Given the rigidities similarly observed in South Africa, the results support the view that employment losses are more likely to take place in rigid labor markets. However, the results are also consistent with the possibility that mergers might lead to lower R&D intensity. We have cited work suggesting the evidence for such effects is slim, and Gugler & Yurtoglu find that including measures of R&D in their specifications does not alter their conclusions, but we cannot dismiss this possibility outright for our data.
Our findings indicate an immediate employment effect of mergers but do not account for the gradual labor shedding that would have occurred in a declining industry and we cannot know the firms' counterfactual employment decisions. Perhaps the short term job losses prolong the survival of the firms through increased productivity, although Schleifer and Summers (1988) argue a breach of implicit contracts has a negative dynamic productivity effect. South Africa's extreme unemployment shows the labor market is ill-equipped to absorb those who want work. Sudden large retrenchments are likely to give those who have lost their jobs an even smaller chance of finding another job than if layoffs had been gradual. Thus, in a country with no generous unemployment insurance scheme, immediate retrenchments associated with mergers imply an additional welfare loss for workers relative to gradual retrenchments.
However, awareness of the welfare losses can create policy responses that try to prevent merger-related retrenchments. In addition to standard legislation, the South African competition authorities are tasked with taking measures to reduce employment effects. Using this mandate, they imposed limits on the number of permitted retrenchments for certain categories of workers as a condition for approval of the unsuccessful Harmony Gold / Gold Fields takeover attempt (Republic of South Africa, 2005) .
Insofar as similar legislation exists in Continental Europe, it may explain why estimated employment losses there are lower than for the United Kingdom in Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) . Legislative responses to merger-related retrenchments may reduce the scope for breaking implicit contracts after takeovers in the future. Table A1 : Results of Perron (1989) unit root test. 1, 2, 3& 4 refer to the provinces. A, B & C refer to the type of break adopted -see Perron (1989) . d_ refers to differenced data. Alpha is coefficient on unit root regression. Gold has additional tests because there are two candidate years for a break. 
APPENDIX: UNIT ROOT AND COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS

